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person. This is one area in which Professor Walsh expressly disavows any
attempt to critique policy or practice, presumably on the ground that it would
stray too far from the subject matter of this text and also on the ground that the
mammoth task of such a critique has also been admirably achieved by
O'Malley's Sentencing Law and Practice. The concluding chapter gives an
account of the various rights of appeal in criminal proceedings, beginning
with appeals from the District Court, the case stated procedure under the
Summary Jurisdiction Act 1857, and the consultative case stated procedure.
Appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal are covered in great detail, including
the requirement of leave to appeal, consequential orders available upon such
leave being sought, and the miscellaneous matters arising, such as bail,
notification of parties, presence of the appellant and other parties at the appeal,
and documents which may be used in the proceedings. The jurisdiction of the
court, the nature of the orders which can be made at the conclusion of the
appeal, and the circumstances in which such orders will be made are also
given a thorough consideration. The matter of appeals to the Supreme Court is
broken down and considered on a court-by-court basis, beginning with appeals
by way of case stated from the Circuit Court, appeals from the Central Criminal
Court, and appeals from the Court of Criminal Appeal. The book concludes
with an account of the miscarriages of justice procedure governed by the
Criminal Procedure Act 1993, with extensive consideration of the principles
established by the judgment inMeleady and Grogan" It is somewhat surprising,
however, that the author omitted to mention the most recent and high-profile
miscarriage of justice in this jurisdiction, in the decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeal inDPP vShortt? Nevertheless, it should be noted that this is an isolated
instance and that the book consistently makes use of the most recent cases
available at the date of publication. Professor Walsh has also indicated an
intention to keep abreast of the rapid rate of change in this area by publishing
subsequent editions in looseleaf form, which should also allow for further
discussion of some of the areas curtailed by constraints of space in this edition.
As the author notes in his foreword, "[t]he rules of criminal procedure
must ... be sufficiently transparent and stable for the average person to make
informed decisions at each stage of his or her criminal investigation, prosecution
and trial, and generally to appreciate what is happening to him or her". Whilst
practitioners immediately recognised the immense value of this book and
rapidly embraced it as an essential tool in their armour, it is equally the case
that Professor Walsh's treatment of the subject makes the rules of criminal
procedure more accessible to students and the general public alike. This work
3. [1997] 1 LL.R.M. 321; UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 8191
1998 (April 4, 2001).
4. [1995] 2 LR. 517.
5. Unreported, July 31, 2001.
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represents an immense achievement for the author, and it is to be welcomed
by all as a tremendous addition to the pool of knowledge on the operation of
the criminal justice system in Ireland.
PATRICIA BRAZIL
Trinity College, Dublin
THE DEAREST BIRTH RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND: THE JURY
IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
By John W. Cairns and Grant McLeod (eds.), (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002)
(243pp, Stg£48, hardback)
"Trial by jury is open to much criticism ... the habit of submitting difficult
problems of fact to twelve men of not more than average education and
intelligence will in the near future be considered an absurdity as patent
as ordeal by battle ... " I
A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study
of the Law of the Constitution, p.22l.
Dicey's verdict on the jury, as elsewhere, was excessive. But, tied up with the
belief in Anglo or Anglo-American exceptionalism, much nonsense has been
spoken of English law throughout its history. The shibboleths of Saxon liberty
have rarely been as excessive as in the case of the jury. By the eighteenth century,
the jury trial was almost universally revered by Britons, its history questionably
traced to the Magna Carta. The actual origins of the jury were with the Frankish
monarchy, who began a form of presentment jury (the English "grand" jury)
with the role of inquest, a procedure subsequently replaced on the continent
with professional Romano-canonical procedures. Through Norman borrowing,
however, the jury was to have a longer, more fruitful life in England. After the
Norman conquest, Henry 11regularised these nascent proceedings to establish
greater control over the administration of justice, first in civil trials and then in
criminal trials. Similarly, the "petit" jury was first essentially a body of witnesses,
called for their knowledge of local customs or of the parties or facts in dispute.
It was not until the reign of Henry VI that the jury became a trier of evidence.
Neither was the image of the jury as democratic, pedagogical, and uniquely
suited to rendering justice immemorial, but it was an essential element of the
English cult of the "ancient constitution" as developed in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. It would continue to remain vital to the English lawyer's
1. A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed.,
Macmillan, London, 1959) p.221.
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self image, retaining an important role wherever the common law travelled or
colonised. The most notable example is perhaps the jury's constitutional status
in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments of the American Constitution. 1 This is
true, too, of Ireland. But while this favourable view of the jury has had its
champions here, the complex Irish experience with English law has qualified
this belief somewhat. As has recently been argued:
"Jury intimidation and prejudice, distrust of the state, considerable
community segregation, and the small and largely rural nature of the
jurisdictions [North and South] have combined to ensure that jury trial is
by no means as entrenched in Irish legal culture as in England and
Wales.,,3
The awareness of Ireland's very different, equally ancient constitution may not
be unimportant.
There has, of course, been a decline in the use of the jury in the last century,
especially the civil jury, throughout the common law world. This is true in the
number of lesser offences tried in summary proceedings before a single judge,
the size of "petit" juries, and the relaxation of unanimity requirements. Ireland
is no exception. In addition, unlike his American counterpart, the English and
Irish judge is also long accustomed to exerting an influence through the
summarisation of evidence for jury deliberation. This is but one of a number
of differences within the common law." Ironically, as the common law has
moved closer to civil law models of judicial management in "civil" cases, in
criminal law the civil law world may appear to be converging in their increasing
use of juries, though these continental juries are far from simple transplants.
Much of the most interesting American work on jury reform has come from
studies of continental procedures and criminal "mixed" courts of professional
and lay judges or elected lay assessors.'
Given its history, Ireland has greater experience than other common law
jurisdictions with non-jury criminal courts." Whether or not it is accurate to
conclude that "the future of the jury system in Ireland is bleak", it may be time
2. See, e.g. A. W. Alschuler and A. G. Deiss, "A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
the United States" (1994) 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867; A. W. Alschuler, "Adding a
Comparative Perspective to American Procedure Classes" (1998) 100 W. Va L.
Rev. 765.
3. J. D. Jackson, K. Quinn, and T. O'Malley, "The Jury System inContemporary Ireland:
in the Shadow of a Troubled Past" (1999) Law & Contemp. Prob. 203, pp.229-230.
4. See, e.g. W. T. Pizzi, "Discovering Who We Are: An English Perspective on the
Simpson Trial" (1996) 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1027.
5. See, e.g. D. G. Smith, "Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and Proposals for Reform" (1997) 48 Ala. L. Rev. 441.
6. See P. Charleton and P. A. McDermott, "Constitutional Aspects of Non-Jury Courts"
(Part 1) (2000) 6:2 TBR 106 and (Part 2) (2000) 6:3 TBR 141.
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to look beyond the neighbouring island for potential sources of jury reform."
Indeed, in the Irish context, as R.J. O'Hanlon noted a decade ago:
"The many weaknesses inherent in the present system of jury trial have
led to its gradual abandonment as a means of dealing with civil claims.
There is a strong case for saying that its retention in the criminal courts
is in [sic] anachronism in the modern constitutional democracy.t"
Unlike the proponents of the English "ancient constitution", the contributors
of The Dearest Birthright of the People of England take the history of the jury
seriously. Published by the increasingly important Hart Publishing, the essays
that make up the book were collected from the Fourteenth British Legal History
Conference on "Parliaments, Juries, and the Law" in Edinburgh (July 1999).
The book is edited by John W. Cairns and Grant MacLeod, professor of legal
history and lecturer in law, respectively, at the University of Edinburgh. As is
noted in its preface, The Dearest Birthright of the People of England:
"[s]hows the way (or ways) forward for further research. It demonstrates
how the jury should be studied comparatively, ignoring questions of
whether jurisdiction is criminal or civil. It shows how there should always
be sensitivity to the relationship between rules relating to proof and the
jury and an awareness of how received traditions may be challenged.
Moreover, the ideological justifications of the jury are shown to have a
significant impact on legal practice. Finally, the volume opens up the
topic of the jury in the nineteenth century for further research."(ix)
While there is unfortunately no Irish contribution, understandable given the
focus of the British Legal History Society, the book's contents are diverse.
Roger D. Groot (Washington and Lee University, Lexington-"Petit
Larceny, Jury Lenity and Parliament") discusses the early distinction between
minor and capital larcenies. This was not, he argues, the result of the Statute
ofWestminster I (1275), as is commonly assumed, but had effectively developed
as a rule in court practice. In determining whether a larceny was minor or
capital, juries were effectively making judgments of value, i.e. of price, as
well as value judgments. The cases of the time are thus very useful to historians,
within law and without, in providing economic values for the period. The
price paid for larceny could also be quite high as a common penalty appears to
have been the loss of an ear! Often jurors were deciding even more and "in
effect, ... deciding who should live and who should die ... [as well as] whether
they were willing to have the defendant amongst them." (pp.58-59).
7. Jackson et al., op. cit., p.23 1.
8. R.J. O'Hanlon, "The Sacred Cow of Trial by Jury" (1990) 27 Ir. Jur. (n.s.) 57, p.68.
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Dafydd Jenkins (University of Wales, Aberystwyth-"Towards the Jury in
Medieval Wales") explores the period before the assimilation of Welsh law
with the common law in 1536. Discussing medieval rules of procedure, he
notes the movement of the "designated compurgators (gwyr nod)" of Wales
towards something closer to the contemporary English jury. This was the result,
in part, of borrowing. Indeed, a major theme of his piece is that "[f]rom one
source or another the Welsh medieval lawyers were continually finding ideas
which could be applied to their own legal problems, and so grafting them onto
the native stock that they would bear fruit." (p.46).
Maureen Mulholland (University of Manchester-"The Jury in English
Manorial Courts") underscores the importance of manorial courts to English
law. This was true both in terms of the courts' contact with ordinary individuals
and in the cross-fertilisation of doctrine with the common law. In addition, the
records of the manorial courts, long ignored by historians, are "an invaluable
historical resource" (p.63). The different courts were part of the larger
administrative and political unit. The seigniorial (or domanial) jurisdiction,
intrinsic to feudal landholding, included the court baron and the court customary
(the "halmote") for free and unfree tenants respectively. As Mulholland notes,
this was an essentially "private" jurisdiction, while the franchise jurisdiction,
that of royal grant, was of a more "public" nature. "It seems that the manorial
courts 'borrowed' the jury from the king's courts" (p.68). The functions of
manorial juries were essentially: "first, declaration of custom, secondly,
presentment, and thirdly, deciding issues" (p.70). The decline of feudalism
and the legal economy of the royal courts guaranteed the gradual eclipse of
the manorial courts."
In his contribution, the always entertaining and erudite David J. Seipp
(Boston University-"Jurors, Evidences and the Tempest of 1499") looks at
run-away jurors, jury communication, and the requirements and necessary
duress of jury participation. He discusses, also, the methods by which jury
unanimity was secured, not least the prohibition on drinking and eating and
jury confinement. "In a nutshell," he writes:
"these cases show that trial jurors in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century
England, in civil and criminal suits, were virtual prisoners of the court
once they were sworn. Before the trial, they were fair game for all sorts
of communication of evidence and arguments by the parties and their
counsel. Then, as soon as they were sworn, they were isolated and
subjected to physical discomfort until they delivered their verdict" (p.75).
_- - -----------------
9. See also R. McMahon, "Manor Courts in the West of Ireland before the Famine" in
D.S. Greer and N.M. Dawson (eds.), Mysteries and SoLutions in Irish Legal History:
Irish LegaL History Society Discourses and Other Papers, 1996-1999 (Four Courts
Press, Dublin, 2001).
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Other informative and interesting asides are sprinkled throughout the piece.
Siepp notes, for example, that communication between jurors and the parties
and counsel to a dispute were limited, but acceptable before trial. It was
permissible, too, for the winning party to provide the jurors with a good dinner!
His main focus is, however, the coercion crucial to getting the jurors to reach a
verdict. In addition, this safety in numbers and uncertainly as to their reasoning
helped to insulate the jurors from blame, giving them a "measure of plausible
deniability" (p.91). Starved and secluded, this would not be difficult to maintain.
Richard D. Friedman (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor-"No Link:
The Jury and the Origins of the Confrontation Right and the Hearsay Rule")
discusses the "rule against hearsay". He argues that the common assumption
that the rule is rooted in the demands of jury trial, recited by figures as august
as Lord Mansfield, is inaccurate. Instead, the rule is rooted in "the fundamental
right of a litigant, especially a criminal defendant, to confront the witness
against him" (p.94). Friedman notes that this right to confrontation is not
restricted to jury systems or the common law. The same idea is present, for
example, in Roman law. He notes that:
"On the one hand, at the core of the hearsay rule is a noble principle that
it is critical to preserve ... [But the] modern hearsay rule is too poorly
articulated, too broad, and too riddled with exceptions to protect that
principle ideally well ...
On the other hand, to the extent that the hearsay rule excludes evidence
where the confrontation norm is not at stake ... the justification for the
rule seems dubious. Certainly the rule has significant costs, most notably
in the loss of valuable information to the truth-determining process"
(p.99).
More clearly than the book's other contributors, Friedman's purposes are not
merely historical. Given recent Irish decisions on the ability of jurors to make
decisions under the direction of the trial judge in cases involving a famous or
notorious accused, this is a particularly fertile suggestion. 10
The contribution of J.R. Pole (University of Oxford-"A Quest of
Thoughts: Representation and Moral Agency in the Early Anglo-American
Jury") underscores the moral dimension of jury decisions. He argues that many
changes in the jury "have not conflicted with but rather, have enabled the jury
to maintain crucial attributes of this essential role of moral agency" (p.lOS).
Representation of some pre-modern or modern variety was one of the jury's
roles, whether "petit" or "grand" jury. With the church, the judge's "charge"
to a grand jury, was a critical point of contact between centre and periphery,
10. See J. L. O'Donnell, "The Jury on Trial: Reflections on DPP v Haugh" (2000) 5
T.B.R. 470.
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state and society. Pole adds, however, that whatever the virtues of participation,
community, or even consent, the pool of jurors was not egalitarian. Indeed, he
notes, too, that the jury:
"is not synonymous with the word 'justice', and the habits of a community
are not invariably derived from instincts of fairness, an ability to weigh
evidence or a capacity to absorb scientific advances; ajury called together
from the locality of the alleged crime could be fallible, prejudiced and
ignorant" (p.129).
This is far from a merely historical observation.
James Oldman (Georgetown University) is the author of The Mansfield
Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth Century
(University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1992), one of the most
important works in legal history in the past decade. His contribution here ("Jury
Research in the English Reports in CD-Rom") is somewhat more minor, but
links the other essays of the collection. Oldman stresses the simplicity and
value of CD-Rom access to the English Reports. In illustrating the possibilities
of research, he discusses the specific writ, the jury of merchants, Chancery
and the special jury, and the disqualification of parties. He notes, too, how this
accessibility can challenge assumptions about past legal doctrine. For example,
it makes questionable the substance of the right to jury trial famously mandated
in the Seventh Amendment of the American Constitution (in suits at common
law involving more than 20 dollars). At least where there were difficult
questions that might be beyond the abilities of the average juror, the historical
record makes this "right" quite questionable.
John Cairns (University of Edinburgh) is the author of numerous pieces on
Scottish legal history, especially the eighteenth century. Appropriately, his title
essay focuses not on the English jury but the civil jury in modern Scottish
legal history. In the early nineteenth century, the "jury trial had come to be
seen not only as a defining characteristic of the (English) common law, but
also as having significant political impact as a mark of liberty and freedom"
(p.1). The introduction of the civil jury to Scotland, with numerous other
reforms, significantly altered the character of its mixed jurisdiction. It was
hoped that the oral and consequently simplifying nature of appealing to a jury
would assist in separating questions of law and fact and better focus the issues
at dispute. Ironically, English rigidity was a virtue in comparison to the
flexibility available in the Scottish adaptation of continental procedures. The
pull of "whig" rhetoric, aided in no small way by the writers of the Scottish
Enlightenment, was a powerful force in an era of general European legal reform.
As a result:
"[i]nstead of Scots law being a traditional set of argumentative practices,
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drawing on Roman law and its commentators, natural law, statutes, and
decisions, negotiated through a complex procedural structure, it was to
be conceived of as a system of dynamic precedent and statutes creating
national rules that were to be applied in a rational court structure that
separated law from fact. Introducing the civil jury was an important part
of that major transformation" (pp.13-14).
Just after its introduction to Scotland, the civil jury came under increasing
criticism in England. Cairns notes the "wonderful irony" that the new civil
jury's existence may have "encouraged ... the elaboration of rules of law to
avoid jury decisions" (p.1S)!
Drawing on his unpublished Ph.D. thesis at the University of Cambridge
(2002)-"Forgery and Criminal Law Reform in England, 1818-1830)"-Philip
Handler (University of Leicester-"The limits of Discretion: Forgery 'and the
Jury at the Old Bailey, 1818-21") looks at the "forgery acquittals" of the early
nineteenth century. These are normally ascribed to widespread humanitarian
disgust at the death penalty, with the jury seen as acting in its role as a
constitutional safeguard against government tyranny. Handler suggests more
complex motives. The trials brought the role of the jurors and judges "into
sharp focus. The two traditions, of modest law finding in everyday criminal
trials and radical law finding in political trials, came together clearly in the
crisis" (pp.16S-166). In the acquittals, the jurors were expressing dissatisfaction
with the evidence in cases involving counterfeit bank notes, a particularly
acute problem in the early century. But:
"their effect was to undermine [the juries'] older role of modestly
mitigating the severity of the law. In the ensuing decades, reform of the
law of sanctions, the coming of the police and the adversarial criminal
trial reduced the jury to its modern, more passive and less overtly
discretionary role" (p.172).
Handler's piece thus fits nicely with those of Cairns, Michael Lobban, and
perhaps especially, Joshua Getzer. Concluding the collection, Getzer (University
of Oxford-"The Fate of the Civil Jury in Late Victorian England: Malicious
Prosecution as a Test Case") writes:
"The dominance of the jury in criminal trials remains, and indeed is
enshrined as a foundation of the legal polity ... because of a perception
that findings of wicked conduct occasioning state punishment should be
inflicted only through the operation of peer or lay justice. Elsewhere,
pockets of strong jury control remain only in those tortuous areas with
stronger moralistic resonance ... " (pp.218-219).
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Thus both Handler and Getzer, in different respects, signal a decline of the jury
in the nineteenth century.
Author of Common Law and English Jurisprudence, 1760-1850, Michael
Lobban (University of London-"The Strange Life of the English Civil Jury,
1837-1914") indicates that this decline was not a simple collapse. He notes,
however, that "[t]he mid-nineteenth-century press abounded with stories of
the absurdities of civil jury trials" (p.174). His example must be quoted in full:
"In 1875, The Times ran a leading article on the case of Mallam v.Attree,
decided at the Gloucester assizes. The defendant was a lady who had
been injured in a railway accident on the Great Western Railway, and
who had been taken to a hotel in Oxford for treatment, for which the
company promised to pay. The company failed to pay the bill, and the
hotel duly sued the woman. The jury listened patiently to the evidence
and the summing up, and after an hour found a verdict of £lOO-against
the Great Western Railway. Grove J. sent the jury back, telling them that
the company was not a party to the action; and they returned some time
later finding a verdict for the defendant, for £100. They were sent away
again. At their third attempt, they found a verdict of £17 for the plaintiff,
a small proportion of the sum claimed. The jury clearly felt that it would
be fair to give the hotel something for their trouble: but, in so doing, they
forgot that the lady would be saddled with the cost of the suit" (p.174)."
Worries of jury corruption, bias, or susceptibility to trial trickery were constant
in the debate on jury reform. But "the civil jury remained an important part of
the legal landscape throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth"
(p.176). Lobban backs his suggestions with a battery of empirical data. He
notes, too, the clash of jury ideology and practice. While thejury was, in practice,
far from democratic, the belief in the sanctity of the jury was repeatedly to
frustrate reform. Indeed, "reformers were seen as iconoclasts, attacking a
cherished institution" (p.207). As a consequence, changes would be postponed
until the early twentieth century.
As The Dearest Birthright of the People of England makes clear, debates
on the jury have a long and complex pedigree. These debates, at least in the
area of criminal law, are not likely to end soon. But Ireland's unique experience
with the jury and the hesitant convergence of European institutions may permit
it to escape common law provincialism or the "[f]orensic forelock touching"
of these islands.F Indeed, most of the interesting and equitable jury reforms of
recent decades are arguably those of the continent and its unique "mixed"
11. M. Lobban Common Law and English Jurisprudence, 1760-1850 (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1991).
12. "Forensic forelock touching is as much a part of the cultural cringe that has beset
our country as the mimicry of English accents and manners, but it may be more
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juries. Comparativists have often noted that the baroque rules necessitated by
jury trials-especially in the cynical, if cinematic, American variant-do not
guarantee truth or justice. John Henry Merryman noted (of another unnamed
scholar) that:
"[h]e said if he were innocent, he would prefer to be tried by a civil law
court, but that if he were guilty, he would prefer to be tried by a common
law court. This is, in effect, a judgment that criminal proceedings in the
civil law world are more likely to distinguish accurately between the
guilty and the innocent.?'?
We would do well, at least, to make ourselves better aware of the options
available to us.
Or SEAN PATRICK DONLAN
Junior Lecturer, University of Limerick
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE SUPERIOR COURTS
by Hilary Delany and Declan McGrath (Thomson Round Hall, Dublin, 2001)
(ISBN 1-85800-241-9) (Hardback, €236)
The Rules of the Superior Courts, even in their consolidated version, can prove
daunting to the legal practitioner and the academic in the absence of an
understanding of the context within which individual rules are set. For example,
reference to the text of a particular rule, together with any amendment, in the
absence of comprehension of the decided case law on the point will invariably
prove problematic. There have, of course, been significant forays into the
procedural underworld of the Rules of the Superior Courts, notably by various
contributors to the Practice & Procedure periodical and, in detail, by 6'Floinn's
Practice and Procedure in the Superior Courts. However, Hilary Delany and
Declan McGrath have produced, for the first time, a truly contextual analysis
of those Rules and the practice and procedure derived therefrom.
The book is thorough, focusing on nearly all the areas of the courts'
jurisdiction. Understandably, given the backgrounds of the authors, each chapter
expounds the relevant principles and recent case law on particular topics in a
manner easily recognisable to the academic. However, this is achieved without
damaging in its long term effects." Mr Justice Niall McCarthy, Foreword to the
First Edition of R. Byrne and J. P. McCutcheon, The Irish Legal System (4th ed.,
Butterworths, Dublin, 2001), v.
13. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems o/Western
Europe and Latin America, (2nd ed., Stanford, 1985), p.132.
